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Abstract
We develop a model of human capital formation with endogenous la-
bor supply and heterogeneous agents to explore the optimal level of
education subsidies along with the optimal progressive schedule of the
labor income tax and optimal capital income taxes. Subsidies on ed-
ucation ensure eﬃciency in human capital accumulation, while taxes
on skilled labor help to redistribute income towards the less able. We
thus provide a rationale for the widely observed presence of education
subsidies. The actually observed tax codes and level of education sub-
sidies suggest that a large part of education subsidies can be justiﬁed
on these grounds.
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11 Introduction
Most OECD countries heavily subsidize (higher) education. These education
subsidies are typically justiﬁed on the basis of the perceived positive exter-
nal eﬀects of human capital accumulation and capital market imperfections.
Positive external eﬀects of higher education, however, are diﬃcult to estab-
lish empirically (see, e.g., Heckman and Klenow, 1997; Krueger and Lindahl,
1999; Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999). Moreover, capital market imperfections
do not seem to be very important (see, e.g., Shea, 2000; Cameron and Taber,
2000).1 Why, then, is education subsidized?
We provide a case for education subsidies on the basis of redistributional
considerations rather than externalities and capital market imperfections.
Although the able beneﬁt more than proportionally from education subsidies,
we show that education subsidies play a crucial role so as to alleviate the
distortions in human capital accumulation that are induced by redistributive
policies. Indeed, our calculations show that these arguments go a long way
towards explaining the level of education subsidies in OECD countries.2
Our paper explores the interaction between public spending and tax poli-
cies by viewing education and tax policies as interdependent instruments
aimed at redistribution.3 The tax literature on the dynamic eﬀects of taxa-
tion on the incentives to accumulate human capital4, in contrast, has typically
abstracted from both public spending and distributional considerations. The
1In any case, loans rather than subsidies are the most direct way to address liquidity
constraints.
2An alternative explanation for education subsidies is oﬀered by Boadway et al. (1996)
and Andersson and Konrad (2000). They argue that education subsidies are called for if
the government cannot commit and engages in excessive redistribution after investments in
human capital have been made. We show that education subsidies are part of an optimal
redistributional policy mix even if the government can commit to announced policies.
3Our paper extends earlier research by Ulph (1977) and Hare and Ulph (1979). They
study the problem of optimal non-linear taxation and education expenditures. In both
studies, however, the government simply sets the level of education for each agent, so that
agents do not choose their levels of learning. Taxation therefore does not distort learning
decisions. This contrasts with our analysis in which tax distortions on learning provide
the argument for subsidizing education.
4See for the literature, e.g., Heckman (1976), Boskin (1977), Kotlikoﬀ and Summers
(1979), Eaton and Rosen (1980), Driﬃl and Rosen (1983), Lord (1989), Nerlove et al.
(1993), Pecorino (1993), Trostel (1993), Jones et al. (1993, 1997), Stokey and Rebelo
(1995), Bovenberg and Van Ewijk (1997), Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), Milesi-Feretti and
Roubini (1998), Hendricks (1999), and Judd (1999), amongst others.
2tax literature may therefore have overstated the costs of distortionary taxa-
tion in terms of reduced accumulation of human capital and understated the
beneﬁts of these taxes in terms of distributional beneﬁts.
We investigate how the availability of education subsidies aﬀects the op-
timal income tax system. In this connection, we consider both the optimal
mix of labor and capital taxation and the optimal progression in marginal
tax rates on labor income. We demonstrate that education subsidies make
the optimal labor tax more progressive. Moreover, education subsidies elim-
inate the case for a positive capital income tax as an instrument to stimulate
learning. Education subsidies ensure that neither human capital investment
nor ﬁnancial investment are distorted, even though the labor tax is progres-
sive. These subsidies thus eliminate tax distortions on the production side of
the economy (see also Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)). Moreover, with sep-
arable preferences, the optimal tax on capital income is zero, even allowing
for distributional concerns.5
In order to study optimal education subsidies along with optimal progres-
sive labor and ﬂat capital taxes, we formulate a two-period life-cycle model
of human capital accumulation with heterogeneous agents.6 Leisure demand
is elastic in both periods of the life cycle. In the ﬁrst period, agents supply
unskilled labor and take out education which allows them to supply skilled
labor in the second period. Compared to the less able, the more able agents
supply more skilled and less unskilled labor and thus concentrate their la-
bor supply more in the second phase of their life cycle. In the ﬁrst period,
they concentrate on acquiring skills rather than supplying unskilled labor.
In the second period, the human capital that has been acquired stimulates
labor supply because human capital is productive only in work and not in
leisure. Indeed, the quantity and quality of second-period labor supply are
interdependent.
Our model is closely related to that of Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), who
explore the role of progressive taxation as an instrument to oﬀset the ex-
cessive learning incentives produced by a positive capital income tax. We
extend their model in several directions. First, we allow for heterogeneous
households. Accordingly, we do not have to exclude uniform lump-sum taxes
5This is a familiar result from inﬁnite horizon models (see, e.g., Chamley (1986), Jones
et al. (1997), and Judd (1999)) and life-cycle models with separable preferences and
homogeneous agents (see Bernheim (1999)).
6We focus on intra- rather than intergenerational distribution by employing debt policy
to oﬀ-set inter-generational inequities.
3as a government instrument to make the optimal tax problem interesting.
Indeed, it is hard to make sense of (dual) income taxation in the absence
of redistributive motives. Moreover, in order to justify progressive taxation
in the presence of endogenous leisure demand, we do not have to resort to
the assumption that unskilled labor supply is more elastic than skilled labor
supply. Instead, the progressive nature of the labor tax system follows imme-
diately from the redistributive motives of the government. More generally,
we extend results on the optimal tax structure of capital and labor income
taxes in dynamic economies (see, e.g. Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Nielsen
and Sørensen (1997), Jones et al. (1993, 1997), and Judd (1999)) by allowing
for heterogeneous agents and distributional concerns.
Second, in contrast to Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), we allow for non-
deductible pecuniary outlays (e.g. tuition fees). We show that, in the absence
of education subsidies, these non-deductible expenses7 make a dual income
tax (with a progressive labor tax and a positive capital income tax) optimal.
The optimal capital income tax is thus positive – even though preferences are
additively separable. Given this preference structure, Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997) have to rely on the exogenous assumption that the government is
committed to a positive tax on capital income to justify a positive capital
income tax. Accordingly, if education subsidies are restricted, we provide a
stronger underpinning for a dual income tax.
The third extension of Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) is that we allow for
education subsidies. We demonstrate that education subsidies eliminate the
case for a dual income tax with positive capital taxes if preferences are ad-
ditively separable. The case for dual income taxation thus depends heavily
on restrictions on the use of the instrument of education subsidies.
Our paper is related also to Lommerud (1989), Van Ewijk and Tang
(2000) and Dur and Teulings (2001). In Lommerud (1989), the government
taxes labor income in order to internalize the negative externalities from sta-
tus seeking but employs education subsidies to restore incentives to undertake
education. In Van Ewijk and Tang (2000), the government employs progres-
sive taxes to punish wage demands of unions and to raise employment, but
this discourages learning eﬀorts. Education subsidies allow the government
to set progressive labor taxes without distorting human capital accumulation.
7Non-deductible expenses explain why ﬂat taxes on labor income harm human capital
accumulation in several growth models (see, e.g., Pecorino (1993), Stokey and Rebelo
(1995), or Milesi-Firetti and Roubini (1998)). In these models, capital goods, which are
non-deductible for the labor tax, enter the production function of human capital.
4Dur and Teulings (2001) analyze the optimal setting of education subsidies
and redistributive income taxes where workers are imperfect substitutes in
production. Education subsidies now not only correct tax distortions arising
from redistribution, but also exert positive distributional eﬀects by reducing
wage diﬀerentials between skilled and unskilled workers through an increase
in the relative supply of skilled workers.
We extend these papers in a number of important ways. First, we allow for
a richer tax code with capital income taxes. Indeed, positive capital income
taxes may play a role in encouraging learning, thereby alleviating inadequate
learning on account of redistributive taxes on skill. Second, we incorporate
non-deductible costs of education, which are observed in many OECD coun-
tries. These costs provide an argument for positive capital income taxes if
education subsidies are constrained. The introduction of endogenous leisure
demand is another extension compared to Van Ewijk and Tang (2000) and
Dur and Teulings (2001). We demonstrate that endogenous ﬁrst-period la-
bor supply is an important factor in explaining: ﬁrst, the progressive nature
of optimal labor taxes; second, the value-added of education subsidies over
taxes on unskilled labor as an instrument to alleviate learning distortions
due to redistributive policies; and, third, the optimality of a positive capital
income tax in the absence of education subsidies.
Many countries have reduced taxes on unskilled labor in recent years in
order to encourage unskilled workers to participate in the labor market. This
suggests that policy makers are indeed concerned about the adverse employ-
ment impact of high taxes on low skilled labor. However, lowering taxes on
the unskilled, thereby making the tax system more progressive, harms in-
centives to acquire skills. We show that the government may want to move
the tax burden from the labor market towards the capital market or to intro-
duce education subsidies to oﬀset tax distortions on human capital formation
without heavily burdening the employment prospects of the unskilled.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. The optimal tax problem is set up in section 3. Section 4 deﬁnes
distributional characteristics of various tax bases and shows that diﬀerences
in learning behavior drive heterogeneity in behavior. We study optimal re-
distributive policies in three steps. First, section 5 investigates optimal labor
income taxation if capital income taxes and education subsidies are exoge-
nously given. Subsequently, section 6 turns to optimal dual income taxation
by also allowing the government to optimally set capital income taxation. Fi-
nally, section 7 introduces education subsidies as an additional instrument.
5This section investigates how the availability of the instrument of education
subsidies aﬀects optimal tax structures. Section 8 investigates to what extent
our model can explain existing education subsidies in several OECD coun-
tries. Section 9 concludes. The appendix contains several technical proofs.
2 Private behavior
We consider a two-period life-cycle model. Before-tax wage rates and interest
rates are exogenously given.8 A mass of agents with unit measure lives for
two periods. In the ﬁrst period, agents devote their time endowment to
supplying unskilled labor, learning, or enjoying leisure. In the second period,
the agents spend their time on leisure, which can be interpreted as retirement,
and supplying skilled labor. Income can be transferred across the two periods
through the accumulation of both ﬁnancial assets (i.e. ﬁnancial saving) and
human capital (i.e. learning). Capital markets are perfect, so that agents do
not suﬀer from liquidity constraints. Agents are heterogeneous with respect
to their ability to learn. The cumulative distribution of the ability to learn ®
is denoted by F(®). F has support [®;1). The government knows only the
distribution of these abilities, but cannot observe the type of each individual.
Accordingly, the government can not levy individual-speciﬁc lump-sum taxes,
but has to rely on distortionary taxes to redistribute incomes.
In each period of their lives, agents are endowed with one unit of time.
They start their lives with one eﬃciency unit of labor. In the ﬁrst period,
a fraction e® of the time endowment is spent on education and a fraction
h1® on leisure, so that a fraction l1® = 1 ¡ e® ¡ h1® is left for (unskilled)
work. The accumulation of human capital requires not only time, but also
commodities. Unit costs of goods per unit of time spent learning amount
to k.9 Education is subsidized at rate s per unit of time spent on learning.
The before-tax wage rates per eﬃciency unit of human capital, as well as the
price of consumption, are normalized at unity in both periods.10
8The model can thus be viewed either as a partial equilibrium model of a closed economy
or a model of a small open economy in which the international capital market ﬁxes the
interest rate.
9We thus do not allow for substitution between goods and time in the accumulation
of human capital. Introducing substitution would merely complicate the analysis without
generating additional insights.
10Workers earn the same gross wage per unit of human capital, so that workers with
diﬀerent skills are perfect substitutes on the labor market. See Dur and Teulings (2001)
6Following Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), we model a labor tax schedule
with two brackets. Below an exogenous threshold Â, labor income is subject
to a tax rate t1. Above this threshold, a tax rate t2 applies. In addition, each
agent collects a non-individualized lump-sum transfer, or negative income
tax, g: If t2 > t1 the tax system features increasing marginal tax rates on
labor income. We assume that ﬁrst-period labor income (i.e. income from
unskilled work) falls only in the ﬁrst tax bracket. First-period labor income
l1® = 1¡e® ¡h1® < Â is thus taxed at a marginal rate of t1. Goods invested
in education are not deductible from the labor income tax.11 Savings a® are
given by after-tax labor income in the ﬁrst period, minus consumption and
the goods invested in learning (net of subsidies):
a® = (1 ¡ t1)(1 ¡ e® ¡ h1®) ¡ c1® ¡ (k ¡ s)e®: (1)
In the second period, human capital is supplied to the labor market in the
form of skilled labor. Á(®;e®) is the production function for human capital
and measures the number of eﬃciency units of human capital resulting from
learning eﬀorts in the ﬁrst period e®. The production function is given by




This production function features positive but diminishing returns to time
invested in education (i.e. Áe > 0 and Áee < 0). Furthermore, ability facil-
itates learning (i.e. Á® > 0), while high ability agents are relatively more
eﬃcient in the production of human capital (i.e. Áe® > 0). In the second
period, a fraction h2® of the time endowment is devoted to leisure, while the
rest (i.e. l2® = 1 ¡ h2®) is spent working. Before-tax labor income (from
skilled work) l2®Á(®;e®) exceeds the tax threshold Â, so that it is subject to
a marginal tax rate of t2, i.e. l2®Á(®;e®) > Â 8®.12 Income from skilled work
can thus be taxed at a diﬀerent marginal rate than income from unskilled
work (if t1 6= t2).
Income derived from accumulation of ﬁnancial assets is (1 + r(1 ¡ ¿))a®,
where r stands for the exogenous real interest rate and ¿ denotes the tax
for optimal education policies and redistribution in a general equilibrium model in which
various skills are imperfect substitutes in demand.
11Tax deductible expenses can be modelled by setting s = t1k:
12This assumption puts a lower bound on ability ® to avoid bunching induced by the kink
in the private budget constraint if the second-period income tax t2 exceeds the ﬁrst-period
income tax t1 (i.e. t2 > t1): See below.
7rate on capital income. All income from human and ﬁnancial sources is
spent on consumption c2. Second-period consumption is untaxed.13 Hence,
the second-period budget constraint amounts to:
c2® = (1 ¡ t2)l2®Á(®;e®) + Ra® + (t2 ¡ t1)Â + g; (3)
where R ´ 1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r.
Households derive utility from consumption and leisure according to the
following quasi-linear utility function:















where ½ represents the pure rate of time-preference and "c; "1;"2 > 0 are
parameters. The speciﬁc utility function implies that income eﬀects in labor
supply and ﬁrst-period consumption are absent.14 Furthermore, our additive
structure implies that various cross-substitution eﬀects drop out. This par-
ticular speciﬁcation of utility does not aﬀect our main results but is used for
ease of exposition. Indeed, the appendix shows that the result that educa-
tion subsidies eliminate learning distortions (derived in section 7) does not
depend on the speciﬁc utility function (4), but holds also with a general util-
ity function u(c1®;h1®;c2®;h2®) that allows for cross-substitution and income
eﬀects.15
Agents maximize utility by choosing e®, c1®, l1®, c2®, l2® and a®, taking
the instruments of the government as given. Indeed, the government is as-
sumed to set policy before agents determine their behavior.16 The ﬁrst-order
13The tax system can be normalized in a diﬀerent way, but this does not aﬀect the
optimal allocation.
14When studying optimal non-linear income taxation in a static model of labor supply,
Diamond (1998) adopts a similar approach by assuming that income eﬀects are absent in
labor supply.
15In contrast to Heckman (1976), this speciﬁcation of the utility function implies that
human capital is not productive in leisure time. Human capital is an investment rather
than a consumption good.
16In view of its distributional preferences, the government faces an incentive to renege on
its promises after the private sector has accumulated human and ﬁnancial capital. We thus
have to assume that the government has access to a commitment technology (e.g. due to
reputational considerations). For the case for education subsidies in case the government
cannot commit, see Boadway et al. (1996) and Ansersson and Konrad (2000).
8condition for optimal learning of the private household amounts to:
(1 ¡ t2)l2®Áe(:) = (1 + r(1 ¡ ¿))(1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s): (5)
The condition states that marginal beneﬁts of an hour’s learning, i.e. the
marginal increments in after-tax second-period income (see the left-hand side
of (5)), should be equal to the marginal costs of learning (i.e. the second-
period value of forgone earnings plus out-of-pocket education expenses (net
of subsidies) in the ﬁrst period, see the right-hand side of (5)). The positive
cross derivative Áe® implies that high-ability agents choose to learn more
than low-ability households do.
The ﬁrst-order condition for learning can also be interpreted as an arbi-
trage condition between the returns on investing a unit of time in learning
(i.e. the left-hand side of (5)) and the returns on investing a unit of time
in ﬁnancial capital (by working and investing the rewards – including the
saved out-of-pocket expenditures on education (net of subsidies) k ¡ s – in
the capital market, i.e. the right-hand side of (5)).
The ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption and leisure yield the following




1 + r(1 ¡ ¿)
¶"c
; (6)
h1 = 1 ¡
µ




h2® = 1 ¡ ((1 ¡ t2)Á(:))
"2: (8)
Demand for ﬁrst-period consumption increases with the capital income tax
¿, as the intertemporal substitution eﬀect of the lower after-tax interest rate
dominates the absent income eﬀect. Similar intertemporal substitution ef-
fects cause a higher capital income tax to boost the demand for ﬁrst-period
leisure. This demand is also increased by a substitution eﬀect on account of
a higher marginal tax rate on ﬁrst-period labor income t1. In the absence
of income eﬀects, all agents demand the same amount of consumption and
leisure in the ﬁrst period, since everybody faces the same net interest rate
and ﬁrst-period wages. Second-period leisure, in contrast, is lowest for high-
ability agents, who beneﬁt from higher second-period wage rates (1¡t2)Á(:)
on account of their higher learning eﬀorts in the ﬁrst period.
9Solving (5) and (8) for learning e® and second-period labor-supply l2® =
1¡h2® by using the functional form (2) for the production function for human




R(1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s)
¶1=(1¡¯(1+"2))
; (9)






Second-period labor income l2®Á(:) rises with ability. Indeed, this income
from skilled labor is proportional to learning:18
l2®Á(:) = ¹e®; (11)
where the proportionality factor ¹ ´
R(1¡t1+k¡s)
¯(1¡t2) does not depend on skill ®.
These solutions imply also that the elasticities of learning and second-period
labor supply with respect to the policy instruments are the same for all
agents. In contrast to second-period labor supply (i.e. skilled labor supply),
ﬁrst-period labor supply l1® = 1¡e®¡h1 (i.e. unskilled labor supply) declines
with ability – as all agents demand the same leisure h1 but high ability agents
spend more time on learning e®. Whereas able agents tend to concentrate
labor supply at the end of their lives, less able agents work relatively more
in the beginning of their lives. The proportionality factor between after-
tax labor income (from unskilled labor) in the ﬁrst period, (1 ¡ t1)l1®; and
learning e® is given by ¡(1 ¡ t1) and thus also independent of skill.
The second-order condition for a maximum requires (see appendix):
¯(1 + "2) < 1; (12)
so that learning and second-period labor supply decline with the second-
period tax rate. The second-order condition guarantees an interior solution
for learning by ensuring that the returns to learning decline if more time is
devoted to learning. The positive feedback eﬀects between human capital and






18This linear relationship follows immediately from (5) and the Cobb-Douglas learning
function (2) and thus does not depend on the speciﬁcation of utility (see also the appendix).








> Â. This constraint implies a lower bound on ®:
10second-period labor supply imply that decreasing returns in the production
function of human capital (i.e. ¯ < 1) are not suﬃcient for this second-order
condition to be met. In particular, more learning raises second period labor
supply (if "2 > 0), which in turn makes learning more attractive. This pos-
itive feedback eﬀect, which depends on the wage elasticity of second-period
labor supply "2, should be oﬀset by suﬃciently strong decreasing returns in
the production function of human capital to prevent corner solutions.
The positive feedback eﬀects between learning and labor supply makes
both the learning decision and the labor supply response more elastic. In
particular, the interaction between the quality and quantity of second-period
labor supply raises the absolute value of the after-tax wage elasticity of
second-period labor supply from "2 in a model without learning (i.e. ¯ = 0) to
"2
1¡¯(1+"2).19 Similarly, endogenous second-period labor supply makes learning
more sensitive to the second-period wage rate (the wage elasticity of learning
is ¡
(1+"2)
1¡¯(1+"2) compared to an elasticity of only ¡1
1¡¯ in a model with exogenous
labor supply (i.e. in which "2 = 0)).
Second-period leisure can be interpreted as retirement. The solutions
thus reveal an important interaction between human capital accumulation
and retirement behavior. On the one hand, early retirement discourages the
accumulation of human capital because it reduces the returns on learning.
On the other hand, a lack of schooling encourages early retirement on account
of low labor productivity. Indeed, the quantity and quality of labor supply
are closely related.
3 Government
The government collects taxes to ﬁnance exogenously given expenditures in
the second period, Λ, the education subsidy s, and the uniform lump-sum
transfer g. The government budget constraint therefore reads as:
Z 1
®







[(1 + r)se® + (t2 ¡ t1)Â + g + Λ]dF(®):
19Hence, if in the absence of learning the wage elasticities of labor supply are the same
in both periods (ie. " ´ "1 = "2); endogenous learning increases the wage elasticity of
labor supply in the second period above the corresponding elasticity in the ﬁrst period.
11Employing the deﬁnition of private savings (1), we can rewrite the gov-
ernment budget constraint in terms of the bases of the labor taxes:
Z 1
®




¿r(1 ¡ c1 ¡ (1 + k)e® ¡ h1)dF(®) =
Z 1
®
[Rse® + g + Λ]dF(®):
For each generation, the government’s budget is fully funded. In contrast to
an approach that maximizes steady-state social utility subject to a steady-
state government budget constraint (see e.g. King (1980) and Sandmo (1985)),
this procedure does not ignore the welfare eﬀects of generations living through
the transition to a new tax system. Our speciﬁcation of the government
budget constraint implies that the government can not raise the welfare of
steady-state generations by transferring resources away from generations liv-
ing through the transition. We thus not only clearly isolate eﬃciency im-
pacts from eﬀects on the intergenerational distribution of resources, but also
model grandfathering schemes in actual tax reforms protecting agents that
have not been able to anticipate the change in the tax rules (see also Nielsen
and Sørensen (1997)).20





0 > 0; Ψ
00 · 0; (15)
where v® stands for the indirect utility function of an agent with skill ®: The
concavity of Ψ reﬂects the strength of the redistributive preferences of the
government. If Ψ is linear, the government maximizes a utilitarian social
welfare function. Together with the quasi-linear private preferences (4), this
implies that the government features no distributional concerns.
4 Distributional characteristics
The interpretation of the optimal policy rules is facilitated by deﬁning dis-
tributional characteristics of the various tax (and subsidy) bases. The dis-
tributional characteristic of a tax base is given by the negative normalized
20Indeed, the government is assumed to have access to enough instruments to insulate
the current generations from the reform. Debt policy suﬃces for this purpose in our two-
period life cycle model. However, if generations would live for more than two periods, the
government would have to levy age-speciﬁc taxes to be able to protect current generations.
12covariance between the welfare weight the government attaches to life-time
income of a particular skill b® (which is non-increasing with the skill level
®) and the marginal contribution of agent ® to the tax base y®(see, e.g.,














A positive distributional characteristic thus implies that the tax base is larger
for high skills (which feature low welfare weights) than for low skills, so that
taxing this base generates positive distributional beneﬁts. The magnitude
of a distributional characteristic depends both on the correlation between
skills and the tax base and the strength of the redistributive preferences as
reﬂected in the negative correlation between skills and the welfare weights.21
Indeed, a distributional characteristic of zero may indicate either that the
government is not interested in redistribution (so that all skills feature the
same welfare weight) or that the marginal contribution to the tax base is the
same for all skills.
The distributional characteristics are closely related because the tax (and
subsidy) bases are all linearly related to learning ea: In particular, ﬁrst-period
labor income (which is subject to t1) is given by 1 ¡ h1 ¡ e®; second-period
labor income (which is subject to t2) by
R(1¡t1+k¡s)
¯(1¡t2) e® (see (11)), and savings
(which is subject to ¿) by (1 ¡ t1)(1 ¡ h1) ¡ c1 ¡ (1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s)e®. Hence,
in the second period, more able agents enjoy higher labor income than less
able agents do because they earn higher wages and work more hours. In
the ﬁrst period, in contrast, the least able agents earn the highest labor
incomes, and therefore save most, because they spend less time learning
(and all agents enjoy the same amount of consumption c1and leisure h1).
Using these relationships, we arrive at the following lemma describing the
relationships between the various distributional characteristics. Here, the
subscripts 1, 2, e and a represent ﬁrst-period labor income (i.e. income from
21The strength of this negative correlation depends not only on the concavity of the
function Ψ, but in general also on inequality in life-time incomes. In particular, the
government attaches a higher priority to redistributing incomes if life-time incomes become
more unequal, since marginal utility of income declines with income. However, in the
current set-up, all distributional motives enter through Ψ since marginal utility is constant
and equal to unity for all agents because of the quasi-linear utility speciﬁcation.
13unskilled labor), second-period labor income (i.e. income from skilled labor),
learning and savings, respectively.










® e®dF(®) > 0.
Proof: see appendix.
The distributional characteristics of learning and second-period labor in-
come (i.e. »2 and »e respectively) are positive because the richest agents (i.e.
the most able) learn more and earn more second-period labor income. Since
these agents save less and earn less ﬁrst-period labor income, the correspond-
ing characteristics for ﬁnancial savings22 and ﬁrst-period labor income (i.e.
»a and »1 respectively) are negative.
5 Optimal labor income taxation
















[Rse® + g + Λ]dF(®);
where ´ represents the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government
budget constraint. This section explores the case in which the government
can freely set the parameters of the labor-income tax (i.e. g; t1 and t2) for a
given capital income tax, ¿, and a given learning subsidy s:
22This assumes that economy-wide saving is positive. If saving is negative, the distribu-
tional characteristic is positive – even though the negative covariance is negative because
the denominator of the normalized covariance is negative.
145.1 Optimal lump-sum transfer
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal lump-sum element g amounts to:23
Z 1
®
b®dF = 1: (17)
where b® ´ Ψ0=´ stands for the welfare weight of marginal life-time income of
each of the agents normalized by the marginal value of government revenue.
In deriving (17), we used @v®=@g = 1 (i.e. Roy’s identity) and the fact that
income eﬀects are absent in ﬁrst-period consumption, leisure demands and
learning so that these variables do not depend on the lump-sum transfer
(i.e. @c1=@g = @h1=@g = @h2=@g = @e=@g = 0, see also (6), (7), (8), (9)):
Expression (17) shows that in the optimum the beneﬁts of higher uniform
lump-sum transfers (averaged over all agents, see the left-hand side of (17))
should equal the costs in terms of additional government spending (i.e. the
right-hand side of (17)).24
5.2 Optimal tax on unskilled labor
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal labor tax in the ﬁrst period (i.e. the
marginal tax rate on unskilled labor), t1; amounts to (using
@c1
@t1 = 0 (see (6)




































where (t1 + ¿r=R) stands for the subsidy wedge on ﬁrst-period leisure and
∆ ´
(1¡t1+k¡s)R
1¡t2 ¡ (1 + r)(1 + k) represents the tax wedge on learning (i.e.
the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of learning e® on the government budget constraint).



























23The rest of this paper drops the index ® whenever convenient.
24In the absence of income eﬀects, the marginal costs of public funds, which can be
deﬁned by 1=[
R
b®dF], thus equals unity.
15where we have used the fact that the following elasticities do not depend on

















(1¡¯(1+"2))(1¡t1+k¡s) (the last equality follows from (8)).



















where E1t1 ´ "(1¡h1)t1
(1¡h1) R 1
® e®dF = "1
(1¡h1) R 1
® e®dF > 0: Intuitively, raising the tax
on unskilled labor, t1; imposes distributional losses (the ﬁrst term on the
left-hand side of (18)) and yields a ﬁrst-order welfare loss by worsening the
distortions in ﬁrst-period leisure demand (assuming that (t1+¿r=R) > 0; see
the second term on the left-hand side of (18)). At the optimal tax rate, the
distributional and eﬃciency costs should be equal to the eﬃciency beneﬁts
of raising the tax rate on unskilled labor. These beneﬁts consist of ﬁrst-order
welfare gains due to more learning (assuming that ∆ > 0; see the ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side of (18)) and to higher skilled labor supply (assuming
that t2 > 0; see the second term at the right-hand side of (18)). Intuitively,
skilled and unskilled labor supply are substitutes. Hence, by acting as a
subsidy on skilled labor, a tax on unskilled labor alleviates distortions in the
market for skilled labor by boosting learning and the supply of skilled labor.
In the absence of other taxes (i.e. t2 = ¿ = 0) and with tax deductible








The reason for this subsidy on unskilled labor is that it helps to alleviate
the inequities in lifetime incomes. The subsidy rises with the distributional
characteristic » and falls with the elasticities in labor supply E1t1 and learning
1
1¡¯(1+"2).
5.3 Optimal tax on skilled labor
The ﬁrst-order condition for the second-period labor tax rate (i.e. the marginal




@t2 = 0 (see (6) and
16(7), respectively) and Roy’s identity @v®=@t2 = ¡l2®Á(®;e®) + Â)):
Z 1
®











































1¡¯(1+"2) (the last equality
follows from (9) and (10)) do not depend on skill ®: Employing (11) to
eliminate economy-wide learning
R 1










The distributional beneﬁts of a higher tax rate (i.e. the left-hand side of (20))
should correspond to the additional ﬁrst-order welfare losses as a result of the
high tax rate (i.e. the right-hand side of (20)). These welfare losses are the
sum of the impact on the learning distortion ∆ (∆ > 0 if additional learning
yields a ﬁrst-order gain in welfare) and the distortion in second-period labor
supply t2: In case other tax and subsidies are absent (i.e. t1 = ¿ = s = 0; so
that ∆
¹ = ¯t2); we can employ (20) to solve for t2 (by using the deﬁnitions of
the elasticities "et2 ´
1+"2









where ¯ " ´
"2+¯(1+"2)
1¡¯(1+"2) denotes the combined elasticity of learning and skilled
labor supply with respect to the reward of supplying skilled labor. In accor-
dance with the standard Ramsey intuition, the optimal tax rate on skilled
labor declines with this combined elasticity ¯ " and rises with the eﬀective-
ness of the tax on skilled labor in alleviating life-time income inequality (as
captured by the distributional characteristic »).
175.4 Optimal labor tax schedule
Substitution of (18) into (20) to eliminate the distributional characteristics
















R(1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s)
: (22)














Together with (22), (23) determines the optimal tax structure. In the speciﬁc
case that education expenses are tax deductible (i.e. s = t1k), we can solve





























1t1 = E1t1=(1 + k):
In interpreting the optimal labor tax structure, we ﬁrst turn to the case
in which ﬁrst-period leisure demand is ﬁxed (i.e. E¤
1t1 = 0) and the capital
income tax is absent (i.e. ¿ = 0).25 In this case, a ﬂat tax is optimal (i.e.
t1 = t2). Such a ﬂat tax acts like a pure cash-ﬂow tax on human capital
investment. The inframarginal returns on skill are taxed without distorting
the incentives to accumulate human capital. Indeed, in the presence of such
a pure proﬁt tax on skill, learning is not distorted (i.e. ∆ = 0). As a direct
consequence, ceteris paribus the distributional characteristic »; the tax rate
on skilled labor can be higher than in the absence of an instrument to oﬀset
learning distortions (compare (21) and (24) and note that ¯ " > "¤ ´
"2
1¡¯(1+"2)
if learning is endogenous (i.e. ¯ > 0)).
25The interpretation of the optimal labor tax schedule is equivalent when education
expenses are not deductible, even though there is not a closed form solution.
18Unskilled labor is taxed (i.e. t1 > 0) even though it is subsidized in the
absence of other taxes (compare (19) and (25)) Indeed, unskilled labor is
taxed although this hurts equity. The reason is that the tax rate on skilled
labor t2 is a more eﬃcient instrument to even out the lifetime income distri-
bution, while the tax rate on unskilled labor is most eﬃcient at alleviating
the learning distortions induced by the redistributive tax on skilled labor. In
line with the targeting principle, therefore, the skilled tax is aimed at cor-
recting the income distribution, while the unskilled tax deals with oﬀsetting
the learning distortion.
The presence of a positive capital income tax (i.e. ¿ > 0) aﬀects neither
the optimal tax on skilled labor t2 nor the result of a zero learning distortion
∆
R(1¡t1)(1+k). However, it reduces the optimal tax on unskilled labor t1 below
the tax rate on skilled labor, so that marginal taxes rise with income (i.e.
t2 > t1). Intuitively, the capital income tax favors human capital investment
over other types of saving. A progressive labor income tax26 that taxes
skilled labor relatively heavily oﬀsets this distortion in favor of learning. In
the context of a model with homogeneous households, Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997) employ this argument to argue in favor of a dual income tax in which
labor income is taxed at progressive marginal rates if the government is
committed to taxing capital income at positive rates. We show that this
argument holds also in a setting with heterogenous households (implying
vertical equity considerations) and relatively elastic skilled labor supply.
Our results both strengthen and weaken the results of Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997). We weaken their results by showing that progressive taxation is called
for only if households are heterogeneous and the government features redistri-
butional preferences (so that the distributional characteristic » is positive).27
With homogeneous households, the government does not have to employ the
distortionary labor income tax to change the income distribution, but can
rely only on the non-distortionary lump-sum tax (i.e. the instrument g) to
26A progressive tax is often deﬁned as a tax under which average tax rates rise with
taxable income. We, in contrast, use the term to mean that marginal tax rates increase
with taxable income.
27Also non deductable education expenses (i.e. k > 0; s = 0) weaken the case for
progressive taxation as an instrument to oﬀset the excessive learning incentives on account
of the capital income tax. The reason is that these non-deductable expenses already
help to reduce the incentives to accumulate human capital. Education subsidies (s >
t1k), in contrast, encourage agents to train themselves, thereby strengthening the case for
progressive labor taxation.
19ﬁnance all its expenditures.
Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) can establish their main result that labor
taxation should be progressive only of unskilled labor supply is more elastic
than skilled labor supply (in terms of the parameters of our model this implies
that "1 is large compared to "2): We strengthen their result by demonstrating
that the result holds true even if the elasticity of unskilled labor supply "1
is small compared to the elasticity of skilled labor supply "2: In the context
of the model developed by Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), inelastic unskilled
labor supply would provide an argument for levying a relatively heavy tax
on unskilled labor (i.e. ﬁrst-period labor supply). In our model, in contrast,
the tax rate on unskilled labor does not exceed the tax rate on skilled labor
if unskilled labor supply is relatively less elastic because not only eﬃciency
but also distributional considerations determine optimal tax policy. In par-
ticular, whereas a high tax on unskilled labor imposes less distortions on
labor supply, it also widens inequities in life-time incomes. Our model thus
provides stronger arguments for progressive taxation.
Education subsidies (i.e. s > 0) have similar eﬀects as the capital income
tax on the optimal progression of the labor income tax. In particular, with
exogenous ﬁrst-period leisure demand, learning is not distorted and the op-
timal tax system is progressive (i.e. t1 = t2¡s if ¿ = k = 0, see (22) and use
the deﬁnition of ∆ ´
(1¡t1+k¡s)R
1¡t2 ¡(1+r)(1+k) with ¿ = k = 0) as the educa-
tion subsidy takes over the role of the tax on unskilled labor in oﬀsetting the
learning distortion imposed by the tax on skilled labor. If education expenses
k are not tax deductible, the optimal labor income tax may be regressive.
Indeed, in the absence of a capital income tax, the tax rate on skilled labor
is given by t1 = (1 + k) t2 ¡ s if ﬁrst-period leisure demand is exogenous
(see (22) and use the deﬁnition of ∆ ´
(1¡t1+k¡s)R
1¡t2 ¡ (1 + r)(1 + k) with
¿ = s = 0). Accordingly, the optimal labor tax is regressive if education sub-
sidies are small, non-deductible expenses are important, and distributional
considerations are important (so that the optimal tax on skilled labor is
large). Intuitively, if the labor tax does not allow deductibility of education
expenses, the tax on unskilled labor becomes a less eﬀective instrument to
boost learning. Hence, the tax on unskilled labor needs to be raised more to
oﬀset the learning distortions on account of the redistributive tax on skilled
labor.
Even in the absence of capital income taxes and education subsidies, the
labor income tax is progressive if ﬁrst-period leisure demand is endogenous
20(E1t1;E¤
1t1 > 0). Elastic ﬁrst-period leisure demand models the concerns
of many policymakers that taxes on unskilled labor harm the incentives of
unskilled workers to seek employment. These concerns strengthen the case
for progressive labor taxes. The reason is that with endogenous ﬁrst-period
leisure demand a tax on unskilled labor induces agents to spend more time
not only learning but also enjoying leisure. In this way, the tax not only
corrects for inadequate incentives to accumulate human capital, but also in-
duces excessive leisure demand so that the tax implies both favorable and
unfavorable substitution eﬀects. As a direct consequence, the government
no longer has access to a non-distortionary instrument to oﬀset the learning
distortion implied by the tax on skilled labor. It thus has to trade oﬀ dis-
tortions in learning against distortions in ﬁrst-period leisure demand. This
implies that human capital accumulation is distorted in the optimum (see
(26) with E¤
1t1 > 0). Moreover, ceteris paribus the distributional character-
istic », the government optimally sets a smaller tax rate on skilled labor t2
than with exogenous leisure demand because it no longer can costlessly oﬀset
the learning distortions implied by this tax (see (24) and note that "¤ rises
with E¤
1t1). Indeed, (24) implies that the optimal tax on skilled labor declines
with the learning elasticity ¯ and the elasticities of leisure demands in both
periods (i.e. "1 and "2).
Proposition 1 (Optimal labor income taxation) The optimal labor tax is
progressive (t2 > t1) if ﬁrst-period leisure demand is elastic ("1 > 0),
the capital income tax is positive (¿ > 0), or education subsidies are
positive (s > 0). The tax system is ﬂat (t1 = t2) if ﬁrst-period leisure
demand is inelastic ("1 = 0), the capital income tax is zero (¿ = 0),
and if direct costs are deductible (s = t1k). The optimal labor tax
structure eliminates tax distortions in learning (∆ = 0) only if ﬁrst-
period leisure demand is exogenous ("1 = 0) or redistributional motives
are absent (» = 0).
6 Optimal dual income taxation
Until now we have assumed that the capital income tax ¿ was exogenously
ﬁxed. This section allows the government to freely employ this tax to opti-
mize social welfare. This allows us to investigate the optimal mix between
capital income taxation and a labor income schedule with two brackets.
216.1 Optimal capital income tax
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal tax on capital income ¿ is given by
(using Roy’s identity @v®=@¿ = ra® = r[(1¡t1)(1¡h1)¡c1¡(1¡t1+k¡s)e®]):
Z 1
®























Substituting (1) to eliminate a® and (11) to eliminate l2®Á(®;e®) while using
(17), we arrive at:



































c1 = "c (the second equality











Expression (27) shows that, at the optimum capital income tax, the marginal
costs of raising the tax should equal the beneﬁts of doing so. The three terms
at the left-hand side of the expression stand for the costs: distributional losses
(as the lifetime poor save more because they learn less and thus concentrate
more of their work eﬀort in the beginning of their lives) and the worsening
of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of consumption (assuming that
¿ > 0) and ﬁrst-period leisure demand (assuming that (t1 + ¿r=R) > 0).
The two terms on the right-hand side of (27) represent the beneﬁts of raising
the capital income tax, namely ﬁrst-order welfare gains due to more learning
(assuming that ∆ > 0) and higher skilled labor supply (assuming that t2 >
0).
In the absence of other taxes and subsidies (i.e. t1 = t2 = s = 0 so that














® e®dF + 1
1¡¯(1+"2)
i: (28)
22This subsidy helps to alleviate the inequities in lifetime incomes. Indeed,
the subsidy rises with the distributional characteristic »: The three terms in
the denominator of (28) correspond to the three decision margins that are
distorted by the capital income tax: ﬁrst-period leisure and consumption
demands and learning.
6.2 Optimal taxes on capital and unskilled labor
If the government can freely set ¿ and t1; we can substitute (18) into (27)
to eliminate the distributional characteristic » to arrive at (by using E1t1 =
"(1¡h1)¿(1¡h1)
R 1


















If non-deductible expenses and education subsidies are absent (i.e. k = s =
0), ﬁrst-period leisure demand is inelastic (i.e. "1 = 0) and taxes on skilled
labor are not available to pursue distributional objectives (i.e. t2 = 0),
unskilled labor is subsidized (see (19)) while capital remains untaxed. If not
all education expenses are deductible to determine the base of the unskilled
labor subsidy (i.e. k > 0 while s = 0), the capital subsidy becomes a
more eﬃcient instrument to redistribute in favor of the poor as the higher
educational expenses of the able no longer narrow the base of the labor
subsidy. This distributional beneﬁt of the capital income subsidy has to be
weighted against the additional distortion of the capital income subsidy on
the intertemporal allocation of consumption.
6.3 Optimal dual income tax
If the government can freely determine all parameters of a dual income tax
(i.e. g; t1; t2; and ¿), we can combine (22) and (29). The optimal tax on
capital income is zero if ﬁrst-period leisure demand is exogenous (see (29)
with "1 = 0) or all education expenses are deductible from the labor-income
tax in the ﬁrst period.28 With exogenous ﬁrst-period leisure demand, the
optimal labor tax is ﬂat (i.e. t1 = t2). Hence, the learning decision is not
28With deductable expenses, (24), (25), and (26) determine the optimal tax structure
with ¿ = 0 (see the appendix).
23distorted, so that there is no role for capital income taxation in oﬀsetting
this distortion. With endogenous ﬁrst-period leisure demand, the optimal
labor tax is progressive, thereby discouraging agents to accumulate human
capital. If all education expenses are deductible, however, the capital income
tax still plays no role in oﬀsetting the learning distortion. The reason is that
the ﬁrst-period tax rate on labor is a more eﬃcient instrument to stimulate
learning. Compared to the capital income tax, the tax on unskilled labor
imposes the same distortions on ﬁrst-period leisure demand but, in contrast
to the capital income tax, it does not distort the intertemporal allocation of
consumption.29
The optimal capital income tax is positive if not all education expenses
are deductible from the labor income tax (i.e. k > 0; s = 0) and ﬁrst-
period leisure demand is endogenous (see (29) with k ¡ s > 0 and "1 > 0).
Intuitively, if the labor tax does not allow education expenses to be deducted,
the ﬁrst-period labor tax becomes a less eﬀective instrument to stimulate
learning. As a direct consequence, the tax on unskilled labor would have
to be raised substantially to oﬀset the learning distortion due to the tax
on skilled labor t2 > 0: Such a large ﬁrst-period labor tax would impose
serious distortions in the ﬁrst-period labor market by encouraging agents to
substitute leisure for working time. To contain these distortions in the labor
market, the government relies on the capital income tax to oﬀset the learning
distortions on account of the redistributive tax on skilled labor. In contrast
to the tax on unskilled labor, however, the capital income tax distorts the
intertemporal allocation of consumption. Hence, the optimal mix of taxes
on unskilled labor and capital income balance distortions in the labor and
capital markets.
We thus ﬁnd conditions for a dual income tax with a positive capital in-
come tax and a progressive labor tax to be optimal as a redistributive tax
system.30 The tax on capital income plays an important role in the optimal
29The result that the optimal capital income tax is zero if all education expenses are
tax deductible depends on the speciﬁc utility function (4) in which leisure demands are
weakly separable from consumption. If leisure demands would not be separable from the
intertemporal allocation of consumption, the government would like to employ the capital
income tax to reduce distortions in the labor market.
30The optimal capital income tax eliminates learning distortions if ﬁrst-period con-
sumption demand is inelastic (i.e. "c = 0): A subsidy on unskilled labor then oﬀsets the
distortions on ﬁrst-period labor supply: t1 = ¡¿r=R: If "c;"1 > 0; the learning distortion
is positive in equilibrium (if s = 0):
24tax system and the labor tax becomes more progressive if the capital income
tax is a relatively eﬃcient instrument to boost learning (because it does not
distort the intertemporal allocation of consumption much, i.e. "c is small)
while the tax on unskilled labor is relatively ineﬃcient (because it encour-
ages the unskilled to substantially raise leisure demand, i.e. "1 is large, and
it does not allow substantial education expenses to be deducted). The tax
on capital also becomes a more important tax instrument if distributional
considerations become more prominent. This may seem counterintuitive be-
cause the capital income tax is actually a regressive tax since the low skilled
save more than the high skilled do. The reason why this regressive tax is
nevertheless used more intensively if the government wants to redistribute
more is that the tax on skilled labor is a more eﬃcient instrument for redis-
tribution than the capital income tax, which is targeted solely at oﬀsetting
the learning distortions from the redistributive tax on skilled labor. Indeed,
a positive capital income tax allows for a more progressive labor tax system.
Education subsidies reduce the potential role of capital taxes in oﬀsetting
learning decisions, but also make the labor tax system more progressive.
Proposition 2 (Optimal dual income taxation) The optimal tax on capi-
tal income is zero (¿ = 0) if ﬁrst-period leisure demand is exogenous
("1 = 0) or all education expenses are deductible from the labor-income
tax in the ﬁrst period (s = t1k). If not all education expenses are de-
ductible from the labor income tax (s < t1k) and ﬁrst-period leisure
demand is endogenous ("1 > 0), the optimal tax on capital income is
positive (¿ > 0). The capital income tax becomes larger and the labor
tax schedule becomes more progressive if the intertemporal substitution
eﬀects in consumption are small ("c small), unskilled labor supply is
elastic ("1 large), and education subsidies are low (s small).
7 Education subsidies
This section allows the government to employ the instrument of education
subsidies to optimize social welfare. This allows us to investigate the impact
of this additional policy instrument on the optimal tax structure.
257.1 Optimal education subsidies




@s = 0 (see (6) and (7), respectively) and Roy’s identity @v®=@s = Re®):
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Employing (17) and using (11) to eliminate economy-wide labor income in

















(1¡¯(1+"2))(1¡t1+k¡s) (the last equality






(1¡¯(1+"2))(1¡t1+k¡s) (the last equality
follows from (8)), which do not depend on skill. The distributional costs of
higher educational beneﬁts (i.e. the left-hand side of (30)) should correspond
to the additional ﬁrst-order welfare beneﬁts of the higher subsidies (i.e. the
right-hand side of (30)). These welfare beneﬁts consist of the impact on the
learning distortion ∆ (assuming ∆ > 0) and the distortion in second-period
labor supply t2 (assuming t2 > 0): In case taxes are absent (i.e. t1 = t2 =
¿ = 0 so that ∆=R = ¡s); we can employ (30) to solve for s (by using the
deﬁnitions of the elasticities "es):
s
1 + k ¡ s
= ¡»(1 ¡ ¯(1 + "2)): (31)
Without any other instruments to tax skill, taxes on education (i.e. s < 0)
are used to reduce inequities in lifetime incomes.
7.2 Optimal tax on unskilled labor
If the government can freely set not only the education subsidies but also the
tax on unskilled labor t1, we can substitute (30) into (18) to eliminate the







(1¡t1)) the distortion in ﬁrst-period leisure demand is zero (i.e. t1+¿r=R = 0).





26thus corrects for the impact of a positive capital income tax on the con-
sumption of ﬁrst-period leisure. Without an education subsidy, the tax on
unskilled labor could not be aimed solely at oﬀsetting the distortions on ﬁrst-
period labor supply since this tax must be used also to oﬀset the learning
distortions implied by the redistributive tax on skill. An optimal education
subsidy takes care of the second task so that the ﬁrst-period tax can be
targeted at removing distortions in the labor market in the ﬁrst period.
7.3 Optimal taxes on unskilled labor and capital
If the government can also set the capital income tax optimally, expression
(29) implies that both the capital income tax and the tax on unskilled labor
are absent, i.e.:
¿ = t1 = 0:
Intuitively, a tax on education is a more eﬃcient instrument to tax skill
than subsidies on capital income or unskilled labor are because a tax on
education does not distort ﬁrst-period leisure demand. In this case, the
optimal education subsidy is given from (30) (with ¿ = t1 = 0):
s




(1 + "2) ¡ »(1 ¡ ¯(1 + "2)):
Despite their adverse distributional consequences, education subsidies may
be used to oﬀset the adverse impact of second-period taxes (i.e. t2 > 0) on
learning and on skilled labor supply. Indeed, ceteris paribus the distributional
characteristic »; education subsidies rise with the elasticities of learning ¯ and
second-period leisure demand "2 (assuming that t2 > 0):
7.4 Optimal tax on skilled labor
If the government can simultaneously tax skilled labor supply and provide
education subsidies, we ﬁnd (from substituting (30) into (20) to eliminate








¹(1¡t2)) that education subsidies are set so that the learning wedge
∆ is zero. Taxes on skill are aimed at reducing inequities, while the education
subsidies eliminate distortions in learning. Irrespective of the income taxes







»(1 ¡ ¯(1 + "2))
"2
: (32)
27Comparing (32) with (21), we observe that the additional instrument of the
education subsidy (ceteris paribus the distributional characteristic ») allows
for a higher tax on skilled labor. Intuitively, education subsidies oﬀset the
learning distortions implied by the tax on skill, so that the tax on skilled la-
bor distorts only second-period labor supply. In this way, the combination of
the tax on skilled labor and the education subsidy allows the government to
tax the inframarginal rents (i.e. pure proﬁts) from learning without distort-
ing the marginal incentives to learn.31 This improves the trade-oﬀ between
equity and eﬃciency considerations. Indeed, in equilibrium, the presence of
optimal education subsidies allows the government to be more successful in
combatting inequities, which will reduce the distributional characteristic »:
In order to ensure that learning is not distorted (i.e. ∆ = 0), the optimal
education subsidy amounts to:
s = (1 + k)
µ
1 ¡
(1 ¡ t2)(1 + r)
(1 + r(1 ¡ ¿))
¶
¡ t1: (33)
where t2 is given from (32), while the other taxes ¿ and t1 are exogenously
given.32 In order to interpret this expression, we consider several special
cases in turn.
The ﬁrst case assumes that the capital income tax is zero (¿ = 0), while
direct costs of education are absent (k = 0). In that case, the optimal edu-
cation subsidy corrects for learning distortions on account of the progression
in the labor income tax (i.e. s = t2 ¡ t1): If the tax system is ﬂat (i.e.
t ´ t2 = t1) and the capital income tax is zero (¿ = 0), the optimal subsidy
oﬀsets the impact of non-deductible education expenses on the incentive to
learn (i.e. s = tk). This implies that these expenses have eﬀectively become
deductible against the labor income tax. A third special case is when educa-
tion expenses are absent (k = 0) while the tax system is ﬂat (i.e. t ´ t2 = t1).
In that case, a positive capital income tax implies that, in addition to ﬁnan-
cial saving, also human capital accumulation must be taxed on a net basis
(i.e. s = ¡
r¿(1¡t)
1+r(1¡¿)) < 0) in order to prevent a distortion in the portfolio
choice between human and ﬁnancial capital.
31Note that endogenous learning (i.e. ¯ > 0) still reduces the optimal tax on skilled
labor by raising the elasticity of second-period labor supply "2=(1 ¡ ¯(1 + "2)).
32This expression continues to hold if ¿ and t1 are set optimally in the presence of
general preferences (see the appendix).
287.5 Optimal dual income tax
If the government can optimally set all tax instruments and education subsi-
dies, the tax in skill t2 is given (32), while unskilled labor and capital income
remain untaxed. Hence, a special dual tax system emerges: labor income is
taxed at a rate t2 with a large tax-free allowance Â, whereas capital income is
tax free. The labor tax thus resembles an earned income tax credit (EITC),
where labor income of unskilled labor goes largely untaxed.
The instrument of education subsidies thus has important eﬀects on the
optimal dual income tax. In particular, it makes the labor tax more pro-
gressive by raising t2 and reducing t1. The elasticity of ﬁrst-period leisure
demand determines the contributions of a higher t2 and a lower t1 to the
more progressive labor tax. Elastic ﬁrst-period labor demand tends to raise
the positive response of the tax on skilled labor to the availability of educa-
tion subsidies (compare (32) with (24)). Intuitively, education subsidies are
more eﬃcient than taxes on unskilled labor in ensuring that inframarginal
rents on learning are taxed because they do not distort the demand of leisure
by unskilled workers. The tax on unskilled labor is thus reduced, thereby
making the tax system more progressive. A more sensitive leisure margin
in the ﬁrst period reduces the drop in the unskilled tax rate in response to
the availability of education subsidies because it makes the unskilled tax rate
an unattractive instrument to correct the learning margin even if education
subsidies are absent.
With seperable preferences, the presence of education subsidies elimi-
nates the case for a positive capital income tax as an instrument to stimulate
learning in the presence of non-deductible education expenses and endoge-
nous ﬁrst-period leisure. The reason is that education subsidies are a more
eﬃcient instrument to deal with the learning distortion than capital income
taxes, which distort also ﬁrst-period consumption of leisure and commodi-
ties. In the presence of additively separable preferences, we thus no longer
have a case for a positive capital income tax. The education subsidies ensure
that neither human capital investment nor ﬁnancial investment are distorted,
even though the labor tax is progressive.33
In the absence of ﬁrst-period income and capital taxes, the optimal edu-
33The optimal zero capital income, however, tax depends crucially on the assumed
additive preference structure and the availability of government debt as an instrument to
correct the intergenerational distribution of resources (see Bernheim (1999)).
29cation subsidy is given by:
s = (1 + k)t2 =
(1 + k)»(1 ¡ ¯(1 + "2))
"2 + »(1 ¡ ¯(1 + "2))
: (34)
This expression reveals that education subsidies become more important if
distributional concerns become more prominent, as indicated by a larger dis-
tributional characteristic ». Clearly, education subsidies and redistribution
are Siamese twins since the government employs education subsidies to oﬀset
the adverse impact of taxes on the incentives to accumulate human capital.
Indeed, education subsidies would be zero if redistributional considerations
would be absent (i.e. » = 0).
Proposition 3 (Optimal education subsidies) Optimal education subsidies
ensure that investment in human capital is eﬃcient in a world where
distortionary taxes are used to generate revenues and to redistribute
incomes. The optimal subsidy increases with distributional concerns
(» large) and non-deductible direct costs of education (k large). It
decreases with the elasticity of skilled labor supply "2 and learning ¯:
If preferences are separable, optimal education subsidies allow capital
income and unskilled labor income to go untaxed (i.e. ¿ = t1 = 0) while
skilled labor income is taxed (t2 > 0):
8 Are education subsidies optimally set?
This section explores whether the current levels of education subsidies in
several OECD countries are eﬃcient. To compute optimal education subsi-
dies, we employ (33) and use observed values of the tax parameters t1; t2;
and ¿: We then compare these optimal subsidies with the actually observed
education subsidies in several OECD countries. We conﬁne ourselves to sub-
sidies to higher education because compulsory schooling laws ensure that
progressive taxes do not reduce participation in basic education.
Table A1 in the Appendix contains the required data.34 Since the data
sources do not fully cover all OECD countries, we limit our calculations
34Our measures for wages and subsides apply to 1997 and 1995 while the tax ﬁgures
apply to 1997 and 2000. Since education policies and tax schedules are rather stable over
time, this should not cause serious problems.
30to eight countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands and the United States. We employ the marginal rate in the tax bracket
containing foregone earnings (minus general exemptions) and including local
taxes as a measure for t1. Similarly, the marginal tax rate in the tax bracket
containing the income of a college educated worker (minus exemptions) and
including local taxes is used as a measure for t2. As a proxy for foregone earn-
ings, we take the average yearly gross wage of a male worker with less than
15 years of education. The wage of an educated worker is the average yearly
gross wage of a male worker with more than 15 years of education. With this
deﬁnition, 20% of the overall sample consists of higher educated workers.35
Internationally comparable data on earnings are taken from the International
Adult Literacy Survey by OECD/Statistics Canada (1995). Data from the
International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation (IFBD, 1997; IFBD, 2000)
provide the required information on statutory income tax structures.
As regards the eﬀective tax rate on capital income, countries tax various
sources of capital income in a non-uniform fashion. In order to capture the
potential inﬂuence of capital income taxes on learning decisions, we employ
the average eﬀective rate on capital income as reported in OECD (2000b).
In addition, we present calculations in which capital taxes are set at zero.
The term
(1+r)
(1+r(1¡¿)) in (33) from our two-period model is derived from the
eﬀective yearly interest rate ± by assuming that students are enrolled for ﬁve
years in education between ages ao = 18 and a0 = 23 and then enter the
labor market until the age of a¤ = 65. Hence, the ﬁrst-order condition for









where the left-hand side corresponds to the marginal return from the hu-
man capital investment (assumed to be constant over time). The right-hand
side measures the discounted value of the learning costs. Straightforward
35We thus assume that income diﬀerences between skilled and unskilled workers are
attributable to education. Table A1 in the Appendix reveals that the returns on education
implied by our assumption are close to micro-econometric estimates correcting for ability
bias (see e.g. Ashenfelter et al. (2000)).
31manipulation yields the following:
1 + r
1 + r(1 ¡ ¿)
=
µ
exp[±(a0 ¡ ao)] ¡ 1
1 ¡ exp[±(a0 ¡ a¤)]
¶µ
1 ¡ exp[±(1 ¡ ¿)(a0 ¡ a¤)]
exp[±(1 ¡ ¿)(a0 ¡ ao)] ¡ 1
¶
:
Our calculations assume an eﬀective interest rate of 2% per annum (i.e.
± = :02):
If the ﬁrst-period wage rate (measuring forgone earnings) are w1 rather










1 ¡ (1 ¡ t2)
(1 + r)
1 + r(1 ¡ ¿)
¶
¡ t1:
We measure the subsidy s¤
w1 as total public expenditure per student per year
divided by gross foregone earnings. Direct costs k
w1 are total (i.e. public and
private) direct expenditures on education divided by gross foregone earn-
ings. Actual subsidies and expenditures on higher education are provided
by OECD (2000a). The wage data are denominated in the various curren-
cies. Therefore, we used the OECD PPP-deﬂator to transform the education
expenditures and subsidies back to original currencies.
Table 1 contains the actual and optimal education subsidies as a per-
centage of foregone earnings. Actual subsidies are relatively low in Denmark
because forgone earnings are high due to a compressed wage distribution.
The reverse holds true for the United States and Canada, where low-skilled
wages are relatively low. Even if we employ the positive average eﬀective
rates on capital income as reported in OECD (2000b), optimal education
subsidies are positive and range from 6-27%. Hence, a signiﬁcant part of ac-
tual education subsidies can be justiﬁed on pure eﬃciency grounds. Without
any positive capital income taxes37, optimal education subsidies are consid-
erably larger. In fact, for most countries, the optimal subsidies are close to
the actually observed subsidies. In view of the problematic measurement of
36This expression, which contains only policy variables without any preference param-
eters, requires only that s and t2 are set optimally. Indeed, the appendix shows that this
expression holds for a general utility function with arbitrary (i.e. not necessarily optimal)
values for the other policy parameters t1 and ¿:
37Gordon and Slemrod (1988) argue that this is in fact the relevant case. In their
view, observed tax revenues from capital income taxes are in fact taxes on rents. With
preferences that are intertemporally separable, zero capital income taxes would actually
be optimal in our model.
32capital income tax, the two alternative calculations of optimal subsidies serve
as lower and upper bounds for the optimal subsidies.
Table 1 - Actual and optimal subsidies (% of forgone earnings)
actual optimal optimal (¿ = 0)
Canada 50 25 42
Denmark 25 25 32
Finland 37 10 16
Germany 39 13 23
Italy 29 6 18
Netherlands 40 27 35
Sweden 75 7 24
United States 43 23 40
Sources: see appendix.
9 Conclusion
This paper has studied the optimal setting of a progressive labor tax, a ﬂat
capital income tax and education subsidies. We showed that education subsi-
dies are a powerful instrument to eliminate distortions in the accumulation of
human capital associated with redistributive policies favoring the unskilled.
Education subsidies and redistribution of incomes are thus like Siamese twins
– even though the ones who beneﬁt from the subsidies enjoy relatively high
lifetime incomes. The more the government desires to help the unable, the
more it should employ education subsidies to oﬀset the learning distortions
associated with redistribution. We showed that a substantial part of existing
education subsidies in some important OECD countries can be justiﬁed on
these grounds.
In the absence of education subsidies, we demonstrated that the capital
income tax component of a dual income tax may be positive, even if pref-
erences are separable. With these preferences, however, a positive capital
income tax requires the presence of non-deductible education expenses. We
showed also that the labor income tax component of a dual income tax is
progressive, even if skilled labor supply is relatively elastic compared to un-
skilled labor supply. The introduction of education subsidies reduces the case
for a positive capital income tax, but increases the optimal progression of the
labor income tax.
33In future research we would like to introduce non-tax distortions, such as
positive externalities from human capital accumulation, liquidity constraints,
wage rigidities, and other labor-market distortions (such as union power and
eﬃciency wages). Since these non-tax distortions can be viewed as implicit
tax wedges, the results in this paper provide already some insights. In partic-
ular, positive externalities from human capital accumulation can be viewed
as an implicit tax on learning, liquidity constraints as an implicit subsidy on
capital income, and downward wage rigidities and union power as an implicit
tax on labor. Furthermore, following van Ewijk and Tang (2000), we may
introduce non-veriﬁable training eﬀorts so that education subsidies are no
longer a costless instrument to alleviate learning distortions. The results in
this paper in which education subsidies are exogenously given rather than
optimally set provide already some insights in this case. In particular, if
training eﬀorts are completely non-veriﬁable, the cases without any educa-
tion subsidies become relevant.
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38Appendix
Second-order conditions
Substituting (1) and (3) into (4), we ﬁnd the following unconstrained opti-
mization problem - suppressing the indices ®:
max
e;h1;l2;c1










+ (1 ¡ t2)l2Á(:)
+R[(1 ¡ t1)(1 ¡ e ¡ h1) ¡ c1 ¡ (k ¡ s)e]





The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by:
@u
@e
= (1 ¡ t2)l2Áe(:) ¡ R(1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s) = 0;
@u
@h1
= (1 + ½)(1 ¡ h1)
1
"1 ¡ R(1 ¡ t1) = 0;
@u
@l2






= (1 + ½)c
¡ 1
"c
1 ¡ R = 0:
Manipulation of these ﬁrst-order conditions (and using (2)) yields (5), (6),
(7), and (8).









(1 ¡ t2)l2Áee 0 (1 ¡ t2)Áe 0
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(1+½)























The four leading principal minors of H are respectively:















































In order to guarantee a maximum, the Hessian matrix should be negative def-







2 ¡ ((1 ¡ t2)Áe)





where we substituted l2 = ((1 ¡ t2)Á)"2 (see (8)). Using the Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation (2) of the production function of human capital, we rewrite the
last inequality as (12) in the main text.
¤
Proof lemma
To prove this lemma, we write the bases of the tax on unskilled labor, capital
income, and skilled labor in terms of learning (i.e. in the form of (36)) as
follows:
l1® = 1 ¡ h1 ¡ e®;
a® = (1 ¡ t1)(1 ¡ h1) ¡ c1 + (1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s)e®;
Á(:)l2® = ¹e®;
where the last two expressions follow from (1) and (11). Hence, the three tax
bases (for the taxes on on unskilled labor, capital income, and skilled labor)
are related to learning e® in a linear fashion:
y® = ° + ¼ea; (36)
40where y® stands for the tax base and ° and ¼ do not depend on type ®:































Note that if ° = 0; we have
R 1
® y®dF = ¼
R 1
® e®dF so that »y = »e: The
lemma follows from substituting the speciﬁc linear relationships for each of
the three tax bases.
¤
Generalizing the utility function
We show that the result of a zero learning wedge is robust to a general
speciﬁcation of the utility function that allows for income eﬀects and cross
substitution between consumption and leisure.
Private behavior
Utility is general, and given by function u(c1®;h1®;c2®;h2®) with standard
properties. The private household maximizes utility with respect to the
intertemporal private budget constraint:
c2® + Rc1® + (1 ¡ t2)h2®Á(®;e®) + R(1 ¡ t1)h1®
= (1 ¡ t2)Á(®;e®) + R(1 ¡ t1) + (t2 ¡ t1)Â + g ¡ R(1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s)e®:
This budget constraint implies that the normal (Marshallian) demand func-
tions for c1, c2, h1, and h2 are functions of the relative prices R, R(1 ¡ t1),
(1¡t2)Á(®;e®) and an income term (t2 ¡t1)Â+g¡R(1¡t1 +k¡s)e®: The
compensated (Hicksian) demand functions depend only on the three relative
prices. The compensated demand function for y be can thus be written as:
y® = ¯ y®(R;w1;w2);
41where y® = c¤
1®;h¤
1®;h¤
2®, w1 ´ (1¡t1), w2 ´ (1¡t2)Á(®;e®): We employ as-
terisks to denote compensated demands. The compensated demand function











and that t2 impacts y through two channels, namely not only directly but
















@t2 is independent of
® if the learning function is given by the Cobb Douglas form Á(®;e®) = ®e¯
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We ﬁnd expressions for @e¤
@s and @e¤



































@w2 ¡ (1 ¡ t2)l¤
2®Áee
< 0: (A4)
Second-order conditions require that the numerator in these equations be





























42where the second equality follows from the ﬁrst-order condition for learning
(A2) by eliminating l¤
2Áe(:). In case of a Cobb-Douglas learning function, the













(1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s)
: (A5)
Optimal lump-sum transfer
The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing social welfare with respect the lump-
















































we can write this ﬁrst-order condition as:
Z 1
®
b®dF = 1: (A6)
Optimal tax on skilled labor
The ﬁrst-order condition for the second-period labor tax rate (i.e. the marginal




































1¡t2 ¡(1+r)(1+k) represents the tax wedge on learning
(i.e. the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of learning e on the government budget constraint).
43Substituting the deﬁnition of b® to eliminate Ψ0¸®
´ ;we arrive at:
Z 1
®






























































































into (A7) to arrive at:
Z 1
®




























where we have employed (A6) to get rid of the term containing Â:
44Optimal education subsidy
The ﬁrst-order condition for education subsidies s amounts to (using Roy’s


































We substitute the deﬁnition of b® to eliminate Ψ0¸®





















































































































The ﬁrst-order condition for learning implies:





= R(1 ¡ t1 + p ¡ s)e®:
With a Cobb-Douglas learning function, we have Áee®=Á(:) = ¯ so that:
l2®Á(:) =
R(1 ¡ t1 + p ¡ s)
¯(1 ¡ t2)
e® ´ ¹e®:
45This proportional relationship between l2®Á(:) and e® (which does not depend
on ®) implies that:
R 1
® (¡b® + 1)l2®Á(®;e®)dF
R
R 1
® (b® ¡ 1)e®dF
= ¡
(1 ¡ t1 + k ¡ s)
¯(1 ¡ t2)
: (A10)
Substituting (A5) and (A10) into (A9), and combining the result with


















@t2, we ﬁnd that the term




(1¡t2)ÁedF > 0. Thus, the
learning wedge ∆ has to equal zero. A zero learning wedge ∆ ´
(1¡t1+k¡s)R
1¡t2 ¡
(1 + r)(1 + k) = 0 implies that expression (33) continues to hold.
¤
Solution labor tax schedule with tax deductible expenses
We derive the closed for solutions (24), (25), and (26) for the speciﬁc case that
education expenses are tax deductible (i.e. s = t1k) in the following way. If
education expenses are tax deductible, one needs to take into account of the
fact that the government simultaneously changes s if t1 is aﬀected according
to ds = kdt1. To ﬁnd the optimal level of t1 (and s = t1k), we combine
the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal tax on unskilled labor (if education
expenses are not tax-deductible) (18) and the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal



























(1¡t1) and where E¤
1t1 ´
E1t1=(1 + k).
Substitution of (A11) into (20) to eliminate the distributional charac-






















1¡t2 ¡ (1 + r)(1 + k); we can write the second right-hand
side of this equation as (if s = t1k):
∆

























Solving this expression for
1+¿r
R



























Using this expression to eliminate ∆
¹(1¡t2) = ∆
R(1¡t1)(1+k)¯ (if s = kt1) from
(20), we arrive at (24) (by using the deﬁnitions of the elasticities "et2 ´
1+"2
1¡¯(1+"2) and "l2t2 ´
"2
1¡¯(1+"2)): Substituting (24) into (A14), we establish
(26). (25) is found by using (A12), (A14), and (24).
¤
Optimal capital income tax with tax deductible expenses






® e®dF , "e¿
(1+k) = "et1, and
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so that ¿ = 0.
¤
47Data
Table A1 - Data
Taxes (%)
Country ¿ a t2
b t1
c
Canada 38.6 45d 36d
Denmark 29.1 61e 46e
Finland 19.6 44f 44f
Germany 19.9 32g 29g
Italy 31.0 34 27
Netherlands 24.7 50 38
Sweden 30.5 31h 31h
United States 31.1 34.5d 21.5d
Education expenditures
Exp. in US $i Proportion public (%)j US PPP $k
Canada 14809 82 1.1692
Denmark 7294 95 8.33
Finland 7145 100l 5.9
Germany 9466 79 2.003
Italy 5972 96 1594.82
Netherlands 9989 92 2.0515
Sweden 12981 98 9.6172
United States 17466 75 1
Gross wages
Low skilledm High skilledn ’Return’o
Canada 23453 36588 .11
Denmark 223242 291126 .06
Finland 112808 137918 .04
Germany 30220p 44740p .10
Italy (*1000) 29891 41188 .08
Netherlands 43805 57319 .06
Sweden 160089 205887 .06
United States 22688 41579 .17
Sources: OECD/Statistics Canada (1995), OECD (2000a, 2000b), IFBD
(1997, 2000).
48Notes:
a Average nation-wide tax on capital income in 1997. Source OECD (2000b).
b Marginal personal income tax rate on skilled labor income net of general
exemptions excluding surcharges, including local taxes. Source IFBD (1997).
c Marginal personal income tax rate on unskilled labor income net of general
exemptions excluding surcharges, including local taxes. Source IFBD (1997).
d For Canada and the US, ﬁgures apply to 2000 and are taken from IFBD
(2000) since IBFD (1997) does not report ﬁgures for the US and Canada.
We included unweighed averages of state taxes (Canada: 19%; US: 6.5%).
e Including average municipality tax (29%).
f Including municipality tax (17%).
g Based on single households without dependents.
h Including municipality tax (31%).
i Source OECD (2000a). Figures apply to 1997.
j Source OECD (2000a). Figures apply to 1997.
k PPP deﬂator by OECD is used to transform education expenditures in
local currency.
l No ﬁgures for the share of education expenditures were available in OECD
(2000a). We therefore employed the value of public education expenditures
from OECD (1996).
m Average yearly gross wages of male workers with less than 15 years of ed-
ucation. Source OECD/Statistics Canada (1995).
n Average yearly gross wages of male workers with more than 15 years of
education. Source OECD/Statistics Canada (1995).
o Approximation of the average return to higher education measured as the
percentage increase in wages (assuming that education takes 5 years).
p For Germany wages are reported only in after-tax terms (unskilled DM
24950; skilled DM 35180). We computed gross wages by linearly approxi-
mating the tax schedule taking into account the general income exemption
for single households.
49